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1 Introduction
In August 1998, the Russian currency, the ruble, suffered a double real devaluation following several
years of a crawling peg policy. After that, as the economy recovered, the currency appreciated back
significantly, by more than 80%. This appreciation has caused a great deal of concern in the Russian
public debate - after all, the previous real appreciation of such magnitude was observed in 1995-
1998 and culminated in a disastrous financial crisis. There is no consensus for why the currency has
been appreciating back (or for that matter, why it fell in 1998). The biggest question, perhaps, is
whether the observed increase in the value of the ruble is an equilibrium phenomenon and accords
with the fundamentals, or whether this appreciation is unjustified.
An important factor, which could be the driving force behind both the fall of the currency
in 1998 and its further recovery, is the international price of oil, Russia’s primary export. Thus,
aside from many intrinsic problems connected to bad macroeconomic policy (Kharas, Pinto and
Ulatov 2001), Russia was hit in 1998 by a large terms of trade shock, as the price of a barrel
of oil fell to a single-digit level in the spring of 1998. Consequently, in 2000s, oil price grew to
unprecedented hights in nominal dollar terms.
In this paper, we concentrate our attention on the appreciation of 1998-2005, and investigate
the hypothesis that this appreciation was driven by oil prices, i.e., by fundamentals. To accomplish
this, we build a calibrated model of the Russian economy and subject this model economy to a series
of persistent oil price shocks similar to those observed in the data. The objective is to compare the
simulated appreciation to the observed one, and thus understand whether this increase in the value
of the ruble is consistent with the oil price growth, or whether other factors (perhaps psychological,
political, etc.) had to play a role.
Although we do not analyze in as much detail the appreciation of the ruble before the crisis,
in the period 1995-1998, our model sheds some light on that episode as well. The most immediate
hypothesis for the appreciation observed in that period has to do with the crawling peg policy,
adopted by the Russian monetary authorities in 1995. Such policy is commonly accompanied by
real appreciation, believed by many to be associated with some sort of out-of-equilibrium processes,
such as inflation inertia due to adaptive expectations or lack of credibility (Calvo and Vegh 1999).
If this is true, then following the devaluation of 1998, when the currency was allowed to float, the
exchange rate should have returned back to its equilibrium value. Hence, we study whether further
appreciation could be explained by fundamentals in absence of a rigid fixed exchange rate regime.
Good understanding of the nature of the appreciation is important for several reasons. On the
basic level, it is important to know whether the Russian ruble is overvalued. Not only did the
previous appreciation result in a devastating financial crisis, but international evidence suggests
that rapid appreciations overall tend to end with abrupt reversions of the exchange rates back to a
low level (Goldfajn and Valdes 1999). Therefore, it is not surprising that many policymakers and
independent observers in Russia express concern over the current growth of the real value of the
ruble.
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If the appreciation can be explained by the oil price, on the other hand, then the threat of a
rapid devaluation is not as big. Of course, the ruble can still fall in case oil prices fall, and the
lesson to policy makers should be that trying to defend the current level of the exchange rate under
such circumstances would be a mistake.1 If oil prices stay high, however, then policy-makers face
the threat of the Dutch disease, which could hamper long-run growth. Evidence of Dutch disease
is scant, but can be found, for example, in Sachs and Warner (2000).
Our findings are that it is hard to explain all of the appreciation by oil prices alone, if the
change of oil price is taken to be temporary and households consume out of permanent income.
However, if one takes into account the large increase in the volume of oil exports that took place
during the same period of time, then the observed appreciation becomes consistent with the one
predicted in the model. Alternatively, one can assume rule-of-thumb behavior of consumers or a
permanent nature of the oil price increase, which can generate an appreciation of the ruble of the
observed magnitude with oil price alone. This finding suggests that the appreciation observed in
the data is probably an equilibrium phenomenon, and is largely immune to a possible fall in the oil
prices, since much of this appreciation may have been caused by increase in volume, not price, of
exports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the most commonly cited
explanations for the appreciation of the ruble. Sections 3 and 4 then build a simple two-sector
model of the Russian economy. Section 5 compares the exchange rate simulated in the model
subjected to a series of oil export price and volume shocks with the exchange rate reported in the
official statistics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Brief overview
Here we briefly discuss all possible factors, which could lead to the observed real appreciation of
the Russian ruble. In general, there could be several reasons for this appreciation. The three
fundamental reasons could be the increase in the oil export revenues, which we study, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, and inflow of capital. Two more reasons are non-fundamental: state-controlled
prices of non-tradables and initial under-valuation due to risk factors.
In this paper we concentrate on the first fundamental reason, the oil revenues, in order to see
whether that factor alone could account for the observed appreciation. The intuition is simple.
The unexpected inflow of ”petrodollars” into the economy gives the ability for the consumers to
purchase more imported goods. The income effect raises demand for all types of goods, including
domestic ones. Since import prices are exogenously given by the world markets, only domestic
good prices increase and the domestic currency appreciates.
A natural alternative explanation to consider is the classic Balassa-Samuelson effect. Statistics
1This mistake is typical and was made by many countries in 1997-1998, not only Russia. New Zealand and Chile
are famous examples, while Australia is believed to be a good counter-example, as a country that did not try to defend
its currency following a terms of trade shock in 1997. See, for example, Jonas and Mishkin (2005) for discussion.
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show that productivity increase in Russia has been substantial since 1998, which could in principle
lead to real appreciation. Thus, simple estimation of GDP divided by employment gives an esti-
mate of labor productivity growth by 42% between 1998 and 2004.2 This effect needs to be studied
carefully, of course, but we do not consider it very seriously here for at least two reasons. First, for
the Balassa-Samuelson effect to take place, the increase in productivity needs to be in the tradable
goods sector, which is substitutable with imports. However, most of the goods produced by the
Russian economy seem to be complements, not substitutes of the imported goods. Besides, the
productivity growth differential does not seem to be big at the first glance. According to our esti-
mates from Rosstat data, labor productivity grew 49% between 1999 and 2005 in manufacturing,
which includes the raw material exporting sectors. A much bigger productivity growth occurred in
construction (73%), which is a non-tradable sector, while non-tradable services, such as transporta-
tion and communication, had labor productivity increases of about 41%. In retail and restaurants,
productivity indeed grew much less, by about 23%. Although this decomposition is not strictly the
same as tradable/nontradable production, and looks at gross output rather than value-added, these
figures make us doubt that Balassa-Samuelson effect is a promising path for explanation of the real
appreciation. The second reason for such doubts is that the evidence in favor of Balassa-Samuelson
effect overall seems thin (see, for example, Edwards and Savastano (1999) for a survey), while the
effect of oil prices is much less questionable.
An increase in oil prices and production can be thought of as very analogous to Balassa-
Samuelson effect, however. An increase in oil prices means that relative productivity (at new
relative prices) has risen in this tradable sector, which pushes up wages and prices in other sectors
of the economy.
Capital flows could be another reason for the appreciation, as the government authorities fre-
quently mention reversal of the capital flight from Russia. However, the balance of payment figures
of the Central Bank continue to show huge current account surpluses, which are probably to a large
extent endogenous to the high oil prices: in order to smooth consumption and insure themselves
against risks, agents prefer to keep the windfall oil revenues abroad. Thus, in order to asses the
effects of exogenous flows, one needs to extract that exogenous component, perhaps, by defining it
as flows unexplained by consumption smoothing.
The fourth reason, often cited in the public debate, is non-fundamental: the Russian govern-
ment controls prices of a large share of non-tradable intermediate goods, supplied by the ”natural
monopolies”: electricity, railroads, and gas. It is easy to see that these tariffs are highly correlated
with the real exchange rate. This high correlation is not surprising, since the prices of non-tradables
and the real exchange rate are two ways of thinking about the same thing. However, this obser-
vation does not mean that the real exchange rate is controlled by government rather than market
forces: what we examine in this paper is whether the appreciation, which included inflation within
the state-controlled prices, accorded to the fundamentals. Thus, we believe that the growth in
2These and further numbers are taken from the ”Russia in Figures” statistics published by the Federal State
Statistics Service, also known as Rosstat, www.gks.ru.
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state-controlled prices is not the cause of appreciation, but is appreciation itself.
Finally, there is a fifth potential reason, also non-fundamental. The crisis in August of 1998
was followed by a period of extreme uncertainty, which could have lead to an undervalued currency
immediately after the crisis. In other words, devaluation could lead to an under-shooting of the
exchange rate in the fall of 1998. As the markets calmed down, the exchange rate might have
returned back to its equilibrium value.
Here, we concentrate on the first reason, connected to the oil export revenues, in an attempt to
determine whether this reason alone could explain the 80% appreciation over the period in question.
3 The Baseline Model Economy
We assume that the Russian economy can be approximated by a two-sector model, in which the
nontradable sector produces a composite good, which can only be consumed domestically. The
tradable sector is simply an endowment of exportable natural resources (”oil”). The revenue from oil
sales can be exchanged for imported goods, which are imperfectly substitutable with the domestic
goods, or invested in international bonds (given the importance of capital flows, we assume the
capital markets to be perfectly open).
This set-up does not include a tradable goods sector, which means that the Balassa-Samuelson
effect is impossible to introduce, unless the resource extraction is itself regarded as the tradable
sector, and the growth in export volume – as increase in productivity. Nevertheless, we take such a
simple economy as a close approximation of the reality. Even the final goods, which seem tradable,
are rarely actually traded, and about 85% of all Russian exports are raw materials. Thus, the
vision of domestically produced manufactured goods and services being complements to imports
rather than substitutes seems to us to be a better description of the reality.
3.1 The set-up
The consumer problem is to maximize the present value of utility with respect to the two types of
goods and labor supplied to the nontradable sector:
max
CDt ,C
M
t ,Lt
∞∑
t=0
(1 + θ)−t
[
logCt − L
1+s
t
1 + s
]
,
where Ct ≡
[
a(CDt )
β + (1− a)(CMt )β
]1/β
is a CES aggregate of consumption of the domestic good
CDt and of the imported good C
M
t , and L is labor supply. The discount rate θ is restricted to equal
the world interest rate r.
Producers operate in competitive environment. Domestic goods are produced with a single
factor (labor) subject to a production function of the form Y Dt = L
γ
t . Exported goods are not
consumed but can be exchanged for imported good in the world market at the exogenous price Pt
(terms of trade). We assume that each period an endowment Xt of the exportable good is available.
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The log of the terms of trade follows a first order autoregressive stochastic process:
pt = ρ0 + ρpt−1 + εt.
The material balance condition for the economy is given by
CMt = PtXt −Rt − (Bt+1 − (1 + r)Bt), (1)
where Rt is the reserves accumulation by the monetary authority and Bt is the stock of foreign
assets owned by the economy’s individuals.
3.2 Analysis
The first order conditions are the following:
− ∂U/∂Lt
∂U/∂CMt
=Wt, (2)
Qt
∂Y Dt
∂Lt
=Wt, (3)
∂U/∂CDt
∂U/∂CMt
= Qt, (4)
∂U/∂CMt = Et∂U/∂C
M
t+1, (5)
where Wt is the real wage measured in terms of import goods, Qt ≡ P
D
t
PMt
is the price of domestic
goods in terms of imports (the inverse real exchange rate), and U denotes instantaneous felicity.
The first equation (2) is labor supply, (3) is labor demand by producers. Then, (4) represents
intratemporal choice by consumers with respect to the two types of goods, while (5) is the Euler
equation showing intertemporal choice for imported good.
To solve the system, observe that (2) and (3) together with domestic market clearing give
(CDt )
1+s
γ
−1 = γ
Qt
Ct
, (6)
while the intratemporal consumption choice reduces to[
aCDt
(1− a)CMt
]β−1
= Qt. (7)
These two equations show that there is a unique function translating consumption of one type of
goods into another. Using this observation, we re-write the Euler equation as a function of only
import consumption.
f(CMt ) = Etf(C
M
t+1), (8)
where f(.) is some function.
Hence, there exists a steady state (with perfect foresight for terms of trade process and reserve
purchases) solution, in which consumption of both types of goods and the real exchange rate are
constant. Consumption of imports is equal to the present value of export revenues minus the
present value of reserves accumulation. Consumption of domestic good and its price can be found
using the first order conditions written above.
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3.3 Consumption with autoregressive process for oil price
Even though oil prices are assumed to follow a stationary process, consumption will not be station-
ary, thus, the steady state is not unique (much like in the model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)).
The logic here is that of a standard permanent income hypothesis with imported consumption equal
to expected present value of export less reserves purchases by the central bank.
For the time being, we will abstract from reserves accumulation and return to this issue in an
extension in Section 4.1. Thus, we set here Rt = 0. Log-linearizing the Euler equation around an
initial steady state (see Appendix for technical details) we get
∆cMt =
θ
1 + θ − ρεt,
where εt is a period t percentage innovation to the terms of trade process and all lower case
variables are percentage deviations of corresponding upper case variables. Here, we temporarily set
the volume of exports Xt to be a constant, that is, ∆xt = 0. As could be expected, a positive shock
to terms of trade leads to an increase in imports. The magnitude of this increase crucially depends
on persistence of terms of trade process. In the extreme case when oil prices follow a random walk
and ρ = 1, consumption increases one for one with the increase in oil price.
Log-linearizing the other first order conditions one gets
cDt =
A− β
(1 + s)/γ − β(1−A)c
M
t ,
where A is the steady state share of domestic good consumption in total expenditure (calculated
at market prices). The direction of change of domestic consumption depends on substitutability
between domestic and imported goods in the CES consumption aggregate. If these two goods are
gross complements as we assume (β < 0) then domestic production and consumption of home
goods will rise also following an oil price increase. If they are substitutes instead (β > 0), then
consumption of home good may fall, since more of the very similar goods can be acquired abroad
and this will free time for leisure.
Finally, we look at the effect of the oil price shock on the exchange rate. Using the log-linearized
first-order condition for the intratemporal consumption choice (4), we get an expression for the real
exchange rate
∆qt =
(1− β)(1 + s)/γ
(1 + s)/γ − β(1−A)c
M
t =
(1− β)(1 + s)/γ
(1 + s)/γ − β(1−A)
θ
1 + θ − ρεt, (9)
where we again restrict ∆xt = 0. Unambiguously, the real exchange rate appreciates following
terms of trade improvement.
3.4 Calibration of parameters
The result that a terms of trade improvement leads to a real appreciation is not new: any standard
model would say the same (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). Here, we concentrate on the case of the
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Table 1: Baseline parameter values.
Parameter Description Value
β Relates to elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported good -0.5
s Inverse of elasticity of labor supply w.r.t. real wage 0
θ Discount rate 0.04 p.a.
γ Labor share in production of domestic goods 0.5
ρ First order autocorrelation of oil price process 0.975 p.m.
A Share of domestic goods in total consumption 0.7
dτt/dlnPt Semi-elasticity of reserve purchases w.r.t. oil price 0.25
Russian economy to obtain the exact magnitude of the effect given the process for the oil prices
and the observed reserves accumulation.
The baseline parameter values are given in the Table 1. Parameter β is set to be equal to -0.5 in
order to match the elasticity of import with respect to the real exchange rate found to be -2/3 by
Belomestnova (2002), and then later confirmed by New Economic School (2005). For this elasticity
estimate, a regression of the general form
CMt = αo + α1RERt + α2Ct
was estimated using several different cointegration-based techniques and with several different mea-
surements of the real exchange rate RERt and absorption or output Ct. The estimate of the param-
eter α1, which in our model corresponds to 11−β , varied between about -0.45 and -0.9. Turns out,
the result of our experiment in this paper does not depend strongly on variation of this parameter
within this range. The choice of infinite elasticity of labor supply (obtained, for example, in Hansen
(1985) indivisible labor model) seems to be standard in the literature. Discount rate of 4% per year
is also standard. In accordance with national accounts statistics we set γ to one half since total
wage bill is roughly equal to half of the GDP. Likewise, we set A to 0.7, which matches proportion
of value added in services and construction in total GDP. The persistence of the oil price is chosen
to be 0.975 per month, as this is an estimate of an AR(1) specification for the Brent oil price for
1987-2005 deflated by the US CPI. Thus, the process is highly persistent, but not a random walk.
4 Extensions to the baseline model
Before we proceed with the simulations, several extensions need to be made to the baseline model
in order to bring the model closer to the reality. We discuss three such extensions: accumulation
of international reserves and the stabilization fund, the change of the volume of oil exports, and
proper measurement of the real exchange rate.
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4.1 Accumulation of foreign reserves
During the years 1998-2005, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has played an active role on
the foreign exchange market, buying off a portion of the dollar inflow in order to fight excessive
appreciation of the ruble. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Finance started to run large budget
surpluses, which eventually developed into a stabilization fund, which draws away a large portion
of the export revenues. On average, during these years, the Bank of Russia and the stabilization
fund accumulated about 16% of the export revenues. This policy could indeed have lead to real
depreciation, although the magnitude of this effect and inflationary consequences are a subject of
controversy. Sosunov and Zamulin (2006) have shown that this policy might have lead to a real
long-term depreciation of about 8-9%.
In our model, reserves accumulation can be introduced in several ways, and the effect on RER
will depend greatly on stochastic properties of the term Rt. If this term is pure random noise, then
the effect on the RER will be negligible, as the shock is transitory in every period. The only way
to obtain a meaningful effect on RER is to commit to a policy of continual reserve accumulation
in every period. Such assumption is probably much closer to reality. However, if we set Rt to be a
constant, then there will be an effect on the level of the RER but not on the rate of its appreciation
- the ruble is cheaper but appreciates at the same speed, which corresponds to a vertical shift of
the predicted RER path. The same will happen if we were to assume that Rt is a constant share
τ of export receipts - this policy is mathematically equivalent to reduction of endowment Xt.
The only way to make the reserve policy influence the RER appreciation rate is to make the
share τ depend on the total export revenue. Suppose that the CBR buys back a bigger share of
petrodollars at times of high oil prices, and smaller share at times of low prices. This assumption
is not out of touch with reality. The regression
τt = a0 + a1 log(Pt) + et
estimated on quarterly data using real Brent price (deflated by US CPI) for 1999-2005 gives an
estimate aˆ1 = 0.25 with significance at the 1% level. Here, τt ≡ RtPtXt is the share of revenues that
go into reserves, and PtXt is the total export revenue.
In order to bring this change into the model, we need to re-define the export revenues to
equal Pt(1 − τt)Xt in (1). Thus, effectively, we change the oil price to equal P˜t ≡ Pt(1 − τt), and
log-linearizing about the steady state, we get
p˜t = pt(1− dτt/dlnPt).
The term dτt/dlnPt is the semi-elasticity estimated above to be 0.25.
This result is quite striking. Effectively, we obtain that due to the aggressive interventions on
the part of the CBR, the ruble appreciated 25% less than it could have appreciated. This comes
solely from the fact that the share of the export revenues extracted by the government depended
strongly on the total revenues. If the CBR bought a much bigger share of the revenues (say, half
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of them), but the rate were flat, than there would be a one time decline in the exchange rate at
the time the policy is announced, but no effect on the rate of real appreciation thereafter. In other
words, by increasing the share of export revenues that went into reserves in response to increase in
this export revenue, the Central Bank has made a signal that this share will be high in the future
as well, as long as exports remain large. Thanks to these expectations, the effect of this policy on
the RER turn out to be so great.
4.2 Accounting for volume change
So far, we held the volume of the endowment X fixed and looked only at the effect of the change
in the price of oil. However, beginning 2000, the volume of oil sales has increased considerably.
Thus, after a rather stagnant period before 2000 (in 1995, Russia exported 100 million of tons of
oil to non-CIS countries, then 114 in 1997, 118 in 1998, and 116 in 1999) the oil exports increased
to 128 million tons in 2000, 138 in 2001, 156 in 2002, 186 in 2003, 217 in 2004, and then leveled
off at 214.5 in 2005. Thus, the sheer volume of exported oil almost doubled, growing by over 85%
between 1999 and 2005. To a large extent, this increase was caused by opening of new oil fields
and general investment in more capital. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that this increase in
export volume has a permanent character.
The figures for export volume are available from the customs statistics only on annual basis.
In order to asses the impact of this volume change, we split the annual figures into equal monthly
increments, and add them as permanent changes of Xt. The exact formula for this addition is
shown in (21) at the end of the Appendix. This method of adding the volume change rests on the
assumption that the increase of the volume of oil export is permanent.
4.3 Proper measurement of the real exchange rate
Up to now, we defined the real exchange rate as the price of domestic goods in terms of imports.
Theoretically, this seems to be the correct way of defining the real exchange rate, but this is not
how the RER is measured in international statistics. Rather, the statistics give us the ratio of
domestic CPI to the foreign one. The closest we can get to that measure within our model is the
ratio of domestic CPI to price of imports, which in log-linear form equals
(ApDt + (1−A)pMt )− pMt = A(pDt − pMt ) = Aqt.
This is the measured RER, which we will compare to the actual RER computed by the IMF and
the Bank of Russia. It should be noted that the officially measured RER has smaller fluctuations
than Aqt, simply because the officially measured RER includes prices of imports in the numerator
(the CPI), which cancel out with import prices in the denominator. To account for this in our
simulations, we multiply the coefficient in front of εt in the formula (9) by A.
However, even this ”measured RER” is still not the same as the one reported by the mon-
etary authorities. The official reported RER is the ratio of domestic CPI to the foreign CPI,
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which includes prices of foreign non-tradables. Therefore, we estimate an alternative RER, using
the national accounts data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). This measure is
the implicit GDP deflator divided by the implicit import deflator, and is available at quarterly
frequency.
As will be seen below, the RER measured in this way has grown in Russia significantly more
than the officially reported RER over the time period in question. There are at least two hypothesis
for why this discrepancy can be the case. The first hypothesis is that relative prices of non-tradable
goods have grown in trade partner countries as well, thus putting downward pressure on the officially
measured RER. The second hypothesis is that the officially reported RER puts too little weight on
the U.S. dollar, since most of the Russian exported raw materials are sold to Europe.
5 Simulations
In order to simulate the predicted real exchange rate, we use the formula (9) and feed into it
the residuals from the AR(1) process for Brent oil price deflated by the US CPI with imposed
coefficient of 0.975. We also pre-multiply the formula by (1 − dτt/dlnPt) in order to capture the
effect of reserves accumulation as discussed in Section 4.1. Finally, we pre-multiply the formula by
A to account for proper measurement of the RER, as discussed in Section 4.3. We then normalize
the predicted exchange rate to be equal to the actual in December 1998, the trough of the RER
series. The resultant series is demonstrated in figure 1.
The figure shows four series: the logarithm of the official real effective exchange rate, the rate
calculated by us using the national accounts statistics from Rosstat, the rate simulated from the
oil price series alone, and the rate simulated using both price changes and changes in the volume
of export.
The graph produces several important results. First of all, the two measurements of the RER
give very different pictures. Thus, the officially measured RER has not reached the pre-crisis level
of 1998 in our sample. At the same time, the RER measured using the national accounts data has
surpassed the 1998 level in the spring of 2004. As we discussed above, this can be explained by the
fact that the official RER includes the prices of non-tradable goods in foreign countries, which also
could have grown relative to tradables during the period in question.
Second, we can see that the RER appreciation cannot be explained by oil price increase alone.
This result is very sensitive to some of the parameters, most notably the persistence of oil price
shocks. Obviously, if the shocks are more persistent, then consumption of imports increases by more,
so the RER has to increase more to allow for a greater amount of imported goods in equilibrium.
If the oil price process approaches random walk, that is, if ρ approaches unity, then the simulated
RER will go well above the measured RER, even the RER measured using the national accounts
data. In that way, oil price increase would become sufficient to explain the observed appreciation.
In principle, increasing the magnitude of ρ can be justified in at least two ways. First, the value
0.975 we use is only a point estimate, while the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected
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Figure 1: Exchange rate actual and simulated
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for the deflated Brent series on the sample 1987-2006, and regressions of this type suffer from a
well-known downward small-sample bias. What is interesting is that the unit root is rejected on the
1987-2003 sample. Thus, the failure to reject the unit root is a product of the last several years of
intensive growth in the oil prices, which produced discussion about their permanent shift to a new
long-run level. If the increase in the oil price is indeed permanent, then taking ρ = 1 at least for
this period seems appropriate. Second, ρ = 1 can be an approximation for rule-of-thumb behavior
of consumers. So far, we have assumed perfect permanent income consumers in our economy,
while this assumption is clearly stretching. Many consumers react to current income, especially in
developing countries, due to precautionary savings, borrowing constraints, and habit formation.
What is interesting is that the trough of the simulated price-based RER occurs exactly at the
time of the trough in the officially measured RER, in December 1998. This coincidence speaks
in favor of the oil-based explanation of the RER behavior, suggesting that the RER fell in 1998
following the decline of its fundamental oil price based value. However, the fall in the ”fundamental”
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Figure 2: Exchange rate simulated with ρ = 0.998
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value in 1996-1998 is half as big as the further rise in 1998-2005. Hence, an increase in ρ to 0.998
(justified, for example, by rule-of-thumb consumers) would help replicate the after-crisis behavior
of the RER, but not the pre-crisis level of the RER, which would still seem unjustifiably high. This
situation is shown in Figure 2. This picture shows that after 1998, the RER followed a similar
path to the oil price based fundamental. That is, a rapid appreciation of 1999-2000 (which seems
to have occurred with a year lag after the growth in the fundamental) was followed by about two
years of stagnation, and then growth resumed. Ultimately, the overall predicted appreciation with
this value of ρ seems in line with that in the national accounts based measure of the RER. At the
same time, it is clearly seen that before the crisis, especially in 1997-1998, the measured RER was
well above the oil price based fundamental.
Although we think that a higher ρ may be plausible due to deviations from the permanent in-
come hypothesis, we view the trick of setting ρ = 0.998 as too artificial to be convincing. Therefore,
we return to the Figure 1 with ρ = 0.975 and study the effect of the increased volume of exports,
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which, as we already mentioned, we assume to be permanent. We feed in these changes as shown in
formula (21) of the Appendix, starting to add the volume changes in 2000. The resultant simulated
RER seems to have increased exactly as much as the RER measured with the national accounts
data. Hence, it seems like the observed appreciation of the Russian ruble is consistent with the
growth of export volume and the oil price.
One big concern about the graph is that the actual RER seems to have appreciated most rapidly
in 2000, as is seen from the graph in Figure 1. At the same time, simulated RERs do not show any
such rapid appreciation in that year. Hence, this rapid appreciation of 2000 may point towards the
”undershooting” story, according to which the value of the Russian currency fell too low in 1998
due to political uncertainty, and then recovered in 2000 when the uncertainty resolved with the
election of Vladimir Putin as president. Alternatively, one can write off this rapid appreciation of
the 2000 to short-term rigidities. Thus, until January 2000, the ruble was allowed to fall rapidly
against the dollar in nominal terms. Throughout 2000, however, the nominal exchange rate was
effectively fixed, while domestic prices continued to grow. Thus, inflation inertia together with
fixed nominal exchange rate could have produced excessive real appreciation in 2000.
Finally, we again come back to the comparison of the real appreciation of 1995-1998 with that
of 1998-2005. The volume-based story makes an even stronger case towards the disequilibrium level
of the 1995-1998 RER, since the volume of annual oil exports was even lower then than in 1999.
Therefore, our analysis deems groundless the frequently voiced concerns that the ruble reaching the
pre-crisis level may cause the same balance of payments problems as in 1998. The appreciation of
1999-2006 has been in full accordance with the fundamentals. At the same time, as our Figures 1
and 2 show, there were no such fundamental reasons for appreciation in 1995. Instead, most likely,
the appreciation in 1995 was disequilibrium — the fixed exchange rate policy often produces such
a side effect (Calvo and Vegh 1999). In this way, these two appreciation episodes should not be
regarded to be similar.
6 Conclusion
The calibration experiment in the paper has demonstrated that the observed real appreciation
of the Russian ruble in 1999-2005 is fully consistent with the growth of the oil export revenues
that took place during this period. This growth was due to both the increase in the international
price of oil, and the sheer volume of the exported crude oil. The increase of the oil price alone,
however, cannot explain the appreciation, unless one is willing to accept the increase as permanent,
or the Russian households — as current income consumers. However, a combination of a series
of temporary but persistent oil price shocks with permanent increases in the volume of exports
produces appreciation in a model economy of similar magnitude observed in reality.
This result suggests that, unlike the appreciation of the mid-1990s, which culminated in a
financial crisis, the current appreciation has an equilibrium nature, and does not pose threats to
the balance of payments.
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Appendix
With the felicity function given by
Ut = logCt − L
1+s
t
1 + s
,
where Ct ≡
[
a(CDt )
β + (1− a)(CMt )β
]1/β
, the first order conditions (2)-(5) take the form:
Lst =Wt ·
(1− a)(CMt )β−1
a(Cdt )β + (1− a)(CMt )β
, (10)
Qt · γLγ−1t =Wt, (11)
a(Cdt )
β−1
(1− a)(CMt )β−1
= Qt, (12)
(CMt )
β−1
a(CDt )β + (1− a)(CMt )β
= Et
[
(CMt+1)
β−1
a(CDt+1)β + (1− a)(CMt+1)β
]
. (13)
Substituting equations (11) and (12) for Wt and Qt into the labor supply equation (10), and using
the balance condition CDt = Y
D
t = L
γ
t , we get an equation, which relates the consumption of the
domestic and imported goods at the optimum:
(CDt )
1+s
γ · a(C
D
t )
β + (1− a)(CMt )β
a(CDt )β
= γ. (14)
Using this relation between the consumption of the domestic and foreign goods, we can rewrite the
Euler equation (13) as a function of only import consumption:
f(CMt ) = Etf(C
M
t+1), (15)
where f(·) is some function.
From equations (12), (14), and (15) we observe that there exists a steady state solution in which
consumption of both types of goods and the real exchange rate are constant. Log-linearizing these
equations around this steady state we get:
(β − 1)(cDt − cMt ) = qt, (16)
1 + s
γ
cDt + β(1−A)(cMt − cDt ) = 0, (17)
cMt = Etc
M
t+1, (18)
where qt is the inverse real exchange rate, and A = QC
D
QCD+CM
is the share of domestic goods
consumption in total consumption expenditure in the steady state.
The intertemporal material balance condition for the economy with the zero reserves accumu-
lation gives:
∞∑
k=0
(1 + θ)−k EtCMt+k = Xt
∞∑
k=0
(1 + θ)−k EtPt+k.
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Log-linearizing this condition around the steady state we obtain:
θ
1 + θ
∞∑
k=0
(1 + θ)−k EtcMt+k = xt +
θ
1 + θ
∞∑
k=0
(1 + θ)−k Etpt+k. (19)
From (18) we observe that the left-hand side of the latter equation is equal just to cMt . The
stochastic process assumed for pt gives: Etpt+k = ρkpt. Hence, we rewrite (19) as:
cMt = xt +
θ
1 + θ
∞∑
k=0
(1 + θ)−kρkpt =
θ
1 + θ − ρ pt. (20)
Therefore, taking into account that Et−1cMt = cMt−1 and pt − Et−1pt = εt, assuming that xt follows
a random walk so that Et−1xt = xt−1 and subtracting from equation (20) its expectation of period
t− 1, we obtain:
∆cMt = ∆xt +
θ
1 + θ − ρ εt.
Then, from equations (16) and (17) we get:
cDt =
β(1−A)
β(1−A)− (1 + s)/γ c
M
t ,
and, finally,
∆qt =
(1− β)(1 + s)
(1 + s)− βγ(1−A)∆xt +
(1− β)(1 + s)
(1 + s)− βγ(1−A)
θ
1 + θ − ρ εt. (21)
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